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A MAJOR SETBACK FOR RETIREMENT SAVINGS: 
CHANGING HOW FINANCIAL ADVISERS ARE 




If regulators were to simply outright prohibit Canadians with low and middle incomes 
from seeking financial advice, it would obviously constitute a massive setback for 
individual wealth accumulation and, ultimately, for the economy. In Canada, after all, 
the well-being of a large proportion of retirees relies heavily on their voluntary personal 
and private wealth accumulation, in part due to the shrinking proportion of Canadian 
employees covered by a defined-benefit pension plan. As it is, between a quarter and 
a third of households of all income levels not covered by a defined-benefit plan are not 
set up to retire comfortably. And yet, currently, regulators are entertaining a change to 
the financial services industry that will almost certainly have the net effect of keeping 
the vast majority of Canadians from accessing financial advice. It is not quite a ban, but 
given the effect it will have, it almost could be.
The role of financial advice is pivotal in helping people prepare for retirement. Evidence 
shows that the average individual’s knowledge of basic financial products and concepts 
is quite limited. Research indicates that Canadian households using a financial adviser 
to assist in saving and investment matters and plan their retirement accumulated 1.58 
times as much wealth as did non-advised households after four to six years; after 15 
years, that had increased to 2.73 times. That has an effect on the rest society, too, since 
wealthier retirees enjoy a better quality of life, are less burdensome on government 
income supplements and contribute more to the economy.
One thing that could prove immensely counterproductive to helping Canadians access 
financial advice to better prepare for retirement is the proposal, being considered by 
regulators, to unbundle adviser fees from financial products. The rationale for the move 
is compelling: If advisers receive different commissions depending on the financial 
products they convince their clients to purchase, the advisers are prima facie in a 
conflict of interest situation. There is an incentive for them to recommend products 
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that offer them higher commissions — and to turn over their sales (or churn) more frequently — 
even if the recommendations are not in the best interests of their clients. 
That may seem entirely logical, although studies that investigate adviser behaviour have found 
surprisingly little evidence that advisers provide unsuitable advice as a matter of course and that 
other structures of remuneration lead advisers to adopt practices that are better aligned with 
their clients’ interests. Indeed, research has found that turnover is even higher in unbundled fee-
for-advice portfolios and that advisers tend to recommend to their clients investments that they, 
themselves, place in their own portfolio. Nevertheless, one thing arguably more problematic 
than clients receiving potentially conflicted advice is clients not having access to any advice at 
all. And based on the experience of other jurisdictions that have ordered fees to be unbundled 
and instead be structured as upfront fees, that is the result that ends up occurring for investors 
below a certain income level. In the U.K., after the decision was made to unbundle fees, the 
number of financial advisers fell from more than 40,000 in 2011 to just over 31,000, and has not 
recovered. Major banks, meanwhile, cancelled their financial advice services for clients that had 
only modest assets. The opening of investment accounts worth less than 100,000 pounds fell 
by half. After Australia required fees to be unbundled, there was a similar effect.
There is little to suggest that Canadians would not be left with the same income-related “advice 
gap” were regulators to require fees unbundled here. Simply put, many clients are unwilling to 
pay upfront for unknown results. And any reform that causes investors to separate from their 
advisers, or to never hire one, would be counterproductive to the public policy goals of helping 
Canadians better prepare for retirement. If it is adviser conflicts that regulators are worried 
about, there are better ways to address them — for example, the regulatory regime governing 
fiduciary duty and the potential to enhance the competencies, proficiency and professionalism 
of financial advisers — than creating a system that results in fewer people providing financial 
advice, and fewer people willing to seek it.
1“A man should always place his money, a third into land, 
a third into merchandise, and keep a third at hand”
Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Baba 
Mezi’a, folio 42a
1. INTRODUCTION
Financial advice to the citizenry has a long pedigree, with good cause. Sound financial 
advice contributes to the generation of positive externalities in much the same way as 
education and other public goods do. The economic superiority of a more educated and 
financially astute population invariably leads to greater prosperity. When they are well 
advised, people exhibit greater levels of confidence and empowerment in their personal 
financial affairs. They adopt and stick to sound saving habits, which lead to better economic 
status, particularly in their post-retirement period. These powerful effects of sound 
financial advice are shared by their recipients and the rest of society.
Seeking to improve the quality of financial advice in retail markets, regulators in Canada 
and abroad have been focusing on how financial intermediaries deliver advice to their 
clients, the standards that apply to financial advice and how it is paid for. A key objective of 
their initiatives is to ensure that the advisers’ recommendations are not tainted by personal 
considerations that might work to the detriment of their clients. A common measure is to 
significantly augment disclosure requirements.1 While the scope of other initiatives varies, 
across jurisdictions regulators seek to impose higher standards for advisers and revamp 
compensation structures, some having gone as far as imposing a ban or cap on embedded 
or tied commissions on certain retail financial products. These regulatory trends have 
begun to echo in Canada. The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) has published a 
discussion paper on the appropriateness of adopting a statutory fiduciary duty for financial 
advisers when they provide advice to retail clients and another paper on mutual fund fees, 
the latter followed by two commissioned research reports. Both discussion papers take 
aim at practices such as embedded fees, trailing commissions, and other forms of tied 
compensation, implicitly suggesting that a prohibition to bundled financial advice with 
financial products may be the best course to follow.2
1 
The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) initiatives are centered around: (i) the Fund Facts document; (ii) the 
Client Relationship Model-2 rule (CRM2) rule, which applies to mutual funds, ETFs, equities, and debt products; (iii) the 
requirement that investors be advised of the cost of an investment purchase in advance of trade and, (iv) changes to retail 
client statements that now must show book cost or original cost for each security to be completed by the end of 2016 with 
the addition of performance and costs in dollar terms. The European Council adopted similar disclosure rules in May 2014. 
Effective January 2017, the MiFID II will require firms to provide consumers with information about all costs and charges 
related to both investment and ancillary services, including the cost of advice, the cost of the financial instrument, and any 
third-party charges. Costs must be provided in aggregate and show the cumulative effect on investment return, with an 
itemized breakdown provided upon client request.
2 
CSA, “The Standard of Conduct for Advisers and Dealers: Exploring the Appropriateness in Introducing a Statutory Best 
Interest Duty When Advice is Provided to Retail Clients,” Consultation Paper 33-403 (October 25, 2012); and CSA, “Mutual 
Fund Fees,” Discussion Paper and Request for Comment 81-407 (December 13, 2012). The latter was followed by two 
studies commissioned by the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) on behalf of the CSA: Edwin Weinstein, Mutual Fund 
Fee Research (The Brondesbury Group, 2015); and D. Cumming, Sofia Johan and Yelin Zhang, A Dissection of Mutual 
Fund Fees, Flows and Performance (OSC, October 2015).
2The main impetus for these initiatives by regulators is typically the potential impact of 
the measures on the behaviour of financial advisers and the investment performance of 
individual portfolios. Relatively less consideration is given to the demand and supply sides 
of the equation: how will the new regulations affect individual investors’ demand for and 
access to financial advice and products? How will the availability and delivery of financial 
advice be impacted as financial intermediaries strive to adapt to the new environment? 
And, what will be the likely consequences on wealth accumulation by households imparted 
by the combined changes induced by the new regulatory regime?
This paper seeks to provide answers to these questions. We find that critics of current 
embedded compensation practices tend to base their policy prescriptions on a truncated 
analysis of the likely consequences that would unfold if implemented.3 These consequences 
are much broader and pervasive than investment outcomes. From a public-policy point 
of view, the “outcome” that truly matters is the impact of financial advice on households’ 
accumulation of financial wealth and, therefore, how it is affected under different 
remuneration models. We make the case that voluntary personal savings are unlikely to 
deliver adequate retirement income unless individual investors have access to expert advice 
from competent and well-regulated professional advisers and asset managers on terms that 
are reasonable and conform to their expressed preferences, regardless of whether advice is 
delivered using commission- or fee-based advice models.
We begin by taking stock of the challenges confronting the vast majority of Canadians not 
covered by a defined benefit pension plan to self-accumulate enough wealth to ensure their 
well-being in retirement. We show why individuals seek (or should seek) expert advice 
in personal investment matters and describe the regulators’ concerns stemming from the 
asymmetric knowledge relationship between financial advisers and their retail clients and 
the manner through which these services are generally paid for. We consider the benefits 
stemming from sound financial advice. We argue that the social welfare implications of 
affordable and readily accessible financial advice confirm its value and superiority over 
other means to assist Canadians in adopting sound personal saving habits, make ongoing 
investment decisions which are in their long-term interests and, as a result, accumulate 
larger amounts of wealth.
We address the issue of trust in the retail financial services sector. The propensity of 
financial consumers to seek financial advice is predicated on their level of trust in the 
system and their belief that their financial adviser is dependable and can be relied upon to 
serve their interests. There is no denying that the principal-agent relationship between a 
financial adviser and his clients expose them to both adverse selection and moral hazards. 
We consider the criticism that has been levied in this regard against the current regulatory 
regime and examine how well founded it proves to be.
3 
For instance, the mandates given to the third parties commissioned by Canada Securities Administrators to perform 
research on mutual fund fees were defined as follows: (1) “Researchers, using data sourced directly from Canadian 
investment fund managers, would evaluate the extent, if any, to which sales and trailing commissions influence mutual fund 
sales”; and (2) “Researchers would conduct a literature review to evaluate the extent, if any, to which the use of fee-based 
vs. commission-based compensation changes the nature of advice and investment outcomes over the long term.” Nowhere 
is there mention of the impact of different remuneration structures on the organizational structure and dynamics of the 
financial advice industry, on financial consumers’ behaviour and the consequences of the adaptation of the industry and 
consumers to a new regulatory regime on savings practices and wealth accumulation.
3In the core of the article we address the following question: why does the financial advice 
industry take the form and behave in the manner observed? We suggest that the answer 
resides in the economic nature of financial advice as a “credence good”4 and the interaction 
of the intrinsic characteristics of the service provided with the idiosyncrasies of individual 
investors. The interplay between these factors has significant bearing on the preferences 
of consumers and the conduct of financial intermediaries, which explains to a large extent 
the bundling of financial products with financial advice that has traditionally prevailed in 
financial retail markets worldwide, notably in the distribution of mutual funds. The analysis 
offers insights into the market dynamics for financial advice and makes clear that in an 
environment where saving and investment decisions are left to individuals, the seeking of 
advice by financial consumers and the delivery of advice by the financial industry, and the 
interactions between these two dimensions, must be considered. 
We continue with an examination of the changes set in motion when financial advice 
is unbundled from financial products in a country, either by regulatory fiat or market 
forces. The survey of the transformations that have occurred and continue to unfold 
in those jurisdictions accord with the conclusions derived from the economic analysis 
of retail markets for expert advice. The survey provides strong indications that the 
dynamic consequences unleashed by the prohibition of embedded commissions paid for 
financial advice would not conform to the advocates’ expectations but rather produce 
significant effects running counter to the retirement-policy objectives sought by Canadian 
governments. We note that, as in the United States, Canadian full-service brokerage firms 
have begun to shift their business model towards an asset-based-fee business, a transition, 
however, that is occurring in a marketplace that allows all options. While we recognize that 
digital technologies for delivering advice will provide opportunities to better engage and 
service clients, they also have the potential to disrupt the financial advice industry. 
We conclude that competent and affordable financial advice, the need to expand the advised 
population and means to increase proficiency standards, promote industry best practices 
and enhance suitability requirements must figure prominently in the design of policies 
seeking to promote the financial autonomy of Canadians of all ages.
2. BACKGROUND: INDIVIDUAL SAVING AND INVESTMENT PRACTICES, THE  
 ALLEGED SINS OF COMMISSIONS AND REGULATORY RESPONSES
Financial advice is a huge matter. Canada’s retirement income system differs from that of 
most OECD countries in that, in Canada, the financial well-being of retirees relies much 
more on their individual and voluntary private and personal initiatives. This feature is 
4 
In economic terms, “credence goods” differ from “experience goods” and “search goods.” A search good is a product or 
service with features and characteristics that can be easily evaluated before purchase. An experience good is a product or 
service where the characteristics and features are assessable, but only after consumption or use. In the case of a credence 
good, its “utility” is difficult if not impossible to ascertain even after consumption. Arrow’s seminal exposition on 
“credence goods” pertained to under- and over-provision of health care. Kenneth Arrow, “Uncertainty and the Welfare 
Economics of Medical Care,” American Economic Review 53, 5 (December 1963): 941-973.
4accentuated by the structural changes brought to the Canadian retirement income system5 
and the shift in the proportion of the labour force covered by defined benefit pension 
plans (DB plans) — which offer a guaranteed income stream in retirement — to defined 
contribution plans (DC plans) — which do not. In 2014, about 60 per cent of retirees 
received retirement income from a registered pension plan (RPP); significantly, only 38 per 
cent of employees were then enrolled in such a plan6 and less than 25 per cent of the labour 
force was member of a DB plan (Figure 1). Of great significance is the fact that between 
2000 and 2015, the proportion of private sector employees covered by a DB plan dropped 
from 22.4 per cent to 12.2 per cent.
FIGURE 1 EVOLUTION OF MEMBERSHIP OF REGISTERED PENSION PLANS (000)
2000 2014 
Total Labour Force 14,760 17,802 3,042
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Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM tables 282-0038; 280-0016. 
The direct effect of these changes in the Canadian retirement income system is a 
wholesale transfer of investment performance, inflation, longevity and market risks to 
individuals. They are real. In 2012, the difference in average wealth — defined as the total 
value of assets minus the total value of debt — among Canadian families with the same 
socioeconomic characteristics between those with and without RPP assets amounted to 
$177,000 ($536,000 versus $359,000).7 For the more than 75 per cent of Canadians in the 
labour force who are not members of a DB plan, accumulating enough wealth for a secure 
retirement is a tall order. According to a recent extensive survey, 25 per cent of Canadian 
households covered by a DC plan or group RRSP and 37 per cent of mid- to high-income 
households with no RPP will most likely have insufficient income to live comfortably in 
retirement.8 
5 
The changes include: the decision made in the mid-1980s to index the old age security (OAS) benefits to the consumer 
price index (CPI) rather than to the index of average earnings; the postponement of the age of eligibility for the OAS and 
guaranteed income supplement (GIS) benefits from 65 to 67 years old for Canadians born after March 1958; and the changes 
made to the Canada and Quebec pension plans. Since the CPI will lag the productivity-driven growth in employment 
earnings, the living standards of a substantial number of older Canadians that rely on OAS for retirement income will 
erode compared to other Canadians. Under current conditions, the after-tax ratio of elderly income to non-elderly incomes 
is projected to fall between 2007 and 2040. Richard Jackson, Neil Howe and Keisuke Nakashima, The Global Aging 
Preparedness Index (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, October 2010).
6 
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), “Registered Pension Plans (RPP) and Other Types of Savings 
Plans — Coverage in Canada” (2015).
7 
Statistics Canada, “Study: Employer pensions and the wealth of Canadian families, 2012” (January 2015).
8 
McKinsey & Company, “Building on Canada’s Strong Retirement Readiness” (2015), 9.
5There’s no escaping it: For the vast majority of Canadians presently in the workforce, the 
level of retirement income they can anticipate is increasingly determined by the amount 
of wealth they accumulate through participation in retail financial markets by the time 
they retire. Canadians generally take this individual responsibility seriously. Forty per 
cent of Canadians 25 years and over in the labour force — including about half of those 
that participate in an RPP — own an RRSP account, the highest rate of participation 
in an individual retirement-savings scheme amongst OECD countries, after Germany.9 
Implemented in 2009, the tax-free savings account (TFSA) program has attained a 
comparable level of market penetration, particularly in the low- and middle-income 
segments.10 The 2012 survey of financial security reports that, excluding RRPs, the value 
of private pension assets and tax-free savings accounts amounted to $1.024 billion, and that 
of non-pension assets amounted to $1.047 billion, although the latter is skewed towards the 
most affluent households.11 Overall, the data show that the number of Canadians making 
private savings is large, varies according to age and employment income, and that “those 
who should be privately saving for their retirement actually do.”12 
It remains, however, that 80 per cent of Canadian households own less than $100,000 in 
investible financial assets, which explains to a large extent the importance of mutual fund 
assets in households’ balance sheets. Held by about 4.3 million households, mutual funds 
are the most common and important holding in RRSPs and in registered retirement income 
plans (RRIFs).13 In total, the value of mutual fund assets owned by Canadians in January 
2014 exceeded a trillion dollars ($1,011.2 billion), an amount close to the market value of 
Canadian employer-sponsored pension funds, which stood at about $1.2 trillion.14 Thus, 
the significance of mutual funds extends well beyond their investment attributes: their 
distribution underpins large segments of the retail financial advisory industry, a dimension 
that must be given full weight in the design of retail distribution policies.
In the aggregate, the amount of financial assets accumulated by individual households is 
huge. The acid test is whether or not the savings accumulated by individual households 
are sufficient and invested with a long-term perspective in a manner such as to provide the 
levels of retirement income expected by future retirees. The numerical skills required to 
understand increasingly complex financial products, compare investment alternatives and 
decide which ones to select call for extensive knowledge. International research on financial 
literacy suggests that consumers’ knowledge of basic financial concepts and products is 
quite limited. This stems from the low level of literacy and numeracy prevailing in general 
9 
OECD, “Pensions at a Glance” (2013).
10 
In 2013, 23 per cent of tax filers contributed to an RRSP whereas 27 per cent of tax filers contributed to a TFSA. OSFI, 
“Registered Pension.”
11 
The median amount for family units holding non-pension financial assets was only $9,900. Statistics Canada, Cansim 
Table 205-0002, “Survey of Financial Security (SFS), composition of assets (including Employer Pension Plans valued on a 
termination basis) and debts held by all family units, by age group, Canada and provinces”; and Statistics Canada, Survey of 
Financial Security (2012).
12 
Alexandre Laurin, “The Overlooked Option for Boosting Retirement Savings: Higher Limits for RRSPs” (C.D. Howe 
Institute, September 2014), 1.
13 
Canadian Security Administrators, CSA Investor Index (October 2012).
14 
The market value of Canadian employer-sponsored pension funds totalled $1,228.7 billion at the end of the second quarter 
of 2013. Statistics Canada, Cansim Tables 280-0002 to 280-0004 (December 2013).
6populations. Canada is no exception.15 The lack of financial sophistication and pervasive 
human biases in decision-making limit households’ ability to make sound financial 
decisions.16
Surveys of individual investors paint a consistent picture: individual investors that make 
investment decisions on their own tend to overestimate their financial knowledge and 
investment savvy.17 This bias is confirmed by the results of a survey of Quebec and Ontario 
self-directed individual investors. Although only five per cent of the respondents had a 
financial knowledge score higher than 66 per cent, 22 per cent of the respondents believed 
they would realize returns equal or superior to that of the market.18 Another survey revealed 
that only 17 per cent of investors had realistic expectations about the annual rate of return 
of their personal investment portfolio.19 The U.S. Federal Reserve Board reports that 29.2 
per cent of American investors who hold stocks in their portfolio owned the shares of only 
one company and 53.0 per cent own between two and nine companies.20 These results 
are consistent with the investment pattern of Canadian investors: 59 per cent of Canadian 
investors who actively invest in stocks think there is no systematic relationship between 
risk and return and fail to diversify their portfolio.21 
A second hurdle investors face in making sound financial decisions arises from the 
pervasive behavioural biases in personal finance decision-making. Psychological and 
behavioural economic studies have documented that people do not always act in their own 
best interest, their financial decisions being influenced by heuristics, biases and emotion-
coping mechanisms that often override welfare-enhancing decisions.22 Their decisions 
are influenced by such psychological proclivities as hyperbolic discounting (the tendency 
to prefer short-term gratification — consumption — over longer-term returns — saving); 
inertia and status quo bias (there are no specific functional deadlines for action) and a 
propensity to push to a later date actions that require self-control (St. Augustine’s prayer: 
“give me chastity and continence, but not yet”). When investors shake out of their status 
15 
The results of the 2012 International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) shows that 55 per cent of Canadians 
aged 16 to 65 had a numeracy score below Level 3, which is defined as the “minimum for persons to understand and use 
information contained in the increasingly difficult texts and tasks that characterize the emerging knowledge society and 
information economy.” The results concerning proficiency in literacy convey the same message, with 49 per cent scoring 
below Level 3. With respect to problem-solving in technology-rich environments (PS-TRE), 37 per cent of Canadians 
surveyed scored at Level 2 or 3 on the PS-TRE scale, slightly above the OECD average of 34 per cent. Statistics Canada, 
pub/89-555-X, 2013.
16 
This is documented in an extensive academic literature, including: James Banks, Cormac O’Dea and Zoë Oldfield, 
“Cognitive function, numeracy and retirement saving trajectories,” The Economic Journal 120, 548 (2010): F381-F410; 
Luigi Guiso and Tullio Jappelli, “Financial Literacy and Portfolio Diversification,” EUI Working Paper (European 
University Institute, 2008); Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia S. Mitchell, “Baby Boomers Retirement Security: The Roles of 
Planning, Financial Literacy, and Housing Wealth,” NBER Working Paper 12585 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
October 2006); Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia S. Mitchell, “The Economic Importance of Financial Literacy: Theory and 
Evidence,” Netspar Discussion Papers (April 2013).
17 
Lusardi and Mitchell, “The Economic Importance.”
18 
Cécile Carpentier and Jean-Marc Suret, “Connaissances financière et rationalité des investisseurs: une étude canadienne,” 
(CIRANO, 2011), 31.
19 
Canadian Security Administrators, CSA Investor Index, 4.
20 
Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Consumer Finances (2012), 34.
21 
Cécile Carpentier and Jean-Marc Suret, “Financial Knowledge and Rationality of Canadian Investors” (Quebec: Autorité 
des marchés financiers, 2012), 11.
22 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, Choice, Values and Frames 
(2000); and Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (Toronto: Doubleday, 2011).
7quo bias, their choices of financial products are characterized by an excessive focus on past 
performance, insufficient attention to asset allocation and a tendency to use inappropriate 
timescales over which to assess performance.23 An extensive body of research demonstrates 
that these human traits make individuals prone to investment “mistakes” with the 
significant welfare implications and real consequences that accrue.24 
To help solve these problems, many households turn for advice to financial intermediaries 
and the financial advisers in their employ. Their ambit ranges from technical experts 
who assist clients with complex financial transaction; generalists who, through “holistic” 
advice aimed at wealth accumulation, help households manage their financial affairs 
with a long-term perspective and attain greater financial security; and others that limit 
their engagement with retail clients to “transaction” events where the object of the advice 
pertains to a small investment at a point in time. The nature of financial services a financial 
adviser can provide is licensure dependent. In Canada, full-service brokers offer access 
to the widest range of investment products — individual securities as well as mutual 
funds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and deposit products — whereas advisers holding a 
mutual-fund-dealer’s licence are permitted to sell mutual funds and deposit products but 
not individual securities and derivatives. Investment advisers are regulated by one of three 
self-regulatory organizations. The Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada 
(IIROC) regulates investment dealers, which include about 28,000 brokers. The Mutual 
Fund Dealers Association (MFDA) regulates the mutual fund dealers outside Quebec 
whereas, in Quebec, the Chambre de la sécurité financière performs this role. There are 
about 100,000 mutual fund “approved persons” across the country. Investor Economics 
reports that about 65 per cent of retail investment assets are held in accounts supervised by 
a financial adviser. 
As a rule, financial advisers perform the dual functions of advising clients and selling 
financial products. Although the commingling of the advice and sale roles is typical 
of markets for technically complex products, it does provide ground for self-serving 
practices, which must be counterbalanced by an appropriate legal and regulatory regime.25 
Academics and policy-makers in Canada and abroad have questioned the appropriateness 
of arrangements where the compensation of the financial intermediaries providing advice 
is embedded in the price of the financial products and dependent on commissions and 
other contingent fees from the manufacturers of financial products, rather than being paid 
directly by their customers. The knowledge asymmetry inherent to the relationship between 
a financial adviser and his or her clients and the indirect compensation practices have 
led many influencers and regulatory agencies to assert that such arrangements are laden 
with irreducible conflicts of interest, that they incentivize advisers to provide unsuitable 
advice as a matter of course and, therefore, are unacceptable from an investor-protection 
23 
United Kingdom, Medium and Long-Term Retail Savings in the UK: A Review (2002).
24 
S. Benartzi and R. Thaler, “Naïve Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution Saving Plans,” American Economic 
Review 91 (2001): 79-98; J. Dominitz, and A. A. Hung, “Retirement savings portfolio management, simulation evidence on 
alternative behavioural strategies,” Journal of Financial Transformation 24 (2007).
25 
Roman Inderst and Marco Ottaviani, Markets with Advice: A Framework for Consumer Protection (presented at Toulouse 
Conference on The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis, 2010).
8point of view.26 They are comforted in their position by academic studies comparing the 
performance of the portfolio of “advised” retail investors to benchmarks or index funds 
finding that, in several cases, the fees and commissions earned by financial advisers 
exceeded the investment return they added to an investor’s portfolio.27 
Spurred by these concerns, the U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA), the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission and the Netherlands Authority for the Financial 
Market have adopted sweeping reforms whereby retail investors must pay financial advisers 
directly when purchasing investment funds and a range of other financial products and 
adviser firms are prohibited from taking commissions from product providers. In so doing, 
it is expected that the ban on bundling financial advice with financial products will lead 
to improvements in the quality of financial advice and make it easier for retail investors to 
exercise choices between investment options and financial services providers. This in turn, 
coupled with the greater transparency on fees and costs that is asserted to be a key benefit 
arising from the unbundling policy, is posited to lead to a net improvement in overall 
returns to individual investors. 
The implicit assumptions that underlie the portfolio-performance studies make them poor 
guides for sound public policy making. The assumption that individuals that manage 
their financial affairs without the help of a professional adviser will accumulate the same, 
or more, amount of wealth than those who do is contradicted by empirical evidence. 
Investors who receive professional financial advice save more, accumulate more wealth 
and feel better prepared for retirement than non-advised individuals with similar socio-
economic characteristics.28 These findings provide a strong indication that the value of 
professional advice cannot be confined to “stock-picking” and “market-timing” savvy. 
The academic literature on the use of external sources of advice suggests that individuals 
with higher education and financial sophistication are more likely to use “formal” sources 
of information and advice as opposed to “informal” ones, such as friends, relatives and 
colleagues.29 This constitutes a strong indication that working with a financial adviser 
facilitates the search for information about various savings and investment options, thus 
leading to more-informed decisions, and it suggests that recognition of the benefits of 
financial advice and, therefore, of the willingness to pay upfront for the advice, depends on 
the level of wealth, formal education and financial knowledge of the investor.30
26 
Keith Ambachtsheer, “Comment Letter,” CSA Discussion Paper and Request for Comment 81-407: Mutual Fund Fees 
(2013); Edward Waitzer, “Misdirected criticisms prove need for more reform in financial services,” Financial Post, 
November 2013.
27 
Diane Del Guercio and Jonathan Reuter, “Mutual Fund Performance and the Incentive to Generate Alpha,” The Journal of 
Finance 69, 4, (2014): 1673-1704; Andreas Hackethal, Michael Haliassos and Tullio Jappelli, “Financial advisers: A Case of 
Babysitters?” Journal of Banking and Finance 36, 2 (2012): 509-524; Stephen Foerster et al., “Retail Financial Advice: Does 
One Size Fit All?,” NBER Working Paper No. 20712 (2014).
28 
Claude Montmarquette and Nathalie Viennot-Briot, “Econometric Models on the Value of Advice of a Financial Advisor” 
(2012); Terrance Martin and Michael Finke, “A Comparison of Retirement Strategies and Financial Planner Value,” Journal 
of Financial Planning 27, 11 (2014): 46-53.
29 
Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia S. Mitchell, “Baby Boomers Retirement Security: The Roles of Planning, Financial Literacy, 
and Housing Wealth,” Working Paper 12585 (National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2006); Maarten Van Rooij, 
Annamaria Lusardi and Rob Alessie, “Financial Literacy, Retirement Planning, and Household Wealth” (2008); Danielle 
D. Winchester, S.J. Huston and M.S. Finke, “Investor Prudence and the Role of Financial Advice,” Journal of Financial 
Service Professionals (2011).
30 
Michael S. Finke, Sandra J. Huston and Danielle D. Winchester, “Financial Advice: Who Pays” (Association for Financial 
Counselling and Planning Education, 2011).
9For sure, portfolio performance is an important consideration. Although all investors value 
higher net portfolio returns, a large proportion of investors seek both financial advice and 
portfolio returns and are willing, within reasonable limits, to trade-off after-fee returns 
with financial advice and services to achieve their overall objectives. Weighing in on the 
embedded remuneration issue, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is emphatic 
that, contrary to the direction followed in some jurisdictions, it harbours no intention to 
prohibit the use of fund assets to pay sales costs, stating “that a portion of asset-based 
distribution fees (i.e., asset-based sales charges) functions like a sales load that is paid 
over time.”31 Within the bounds generally accepted for sales commissions and adequate 
disclosure, it has stated that the practice does not constitute an unwarranted use of fund 
assets and it would not benefit individual investors to deny them the ability “to pay for 
distribution services over time.” Their position is supported by the findings of studies that 
have focused on this aspect, which conclude that, contrary to received wisdom, it would 
be welfare-reducing to force investors with a revealed preference for personalized advice 
that self-select into the advice channels to forego these services, despite the lower after-fee 
returns.32 Nor have French securities regulators been swayed by the arguments in favour 
of unbundling (except for discretionary portfolio management and managers of funds of 
funds), indicating that a move away from commission- to fee-based advice is likely to 
lead to account churning with its concomitant negative impact on portfolio returns. The 
evidence indicates that their concerns are well founded.33 At the European Union level, 
effective January 2017, financial firms that advertise themselves as providing advice 
or portfolio management on an “independent basis” will be precluded from receiving 
commissions or other monetary benefits from any third party in relation to these services. 
Notably, this prohibition will not apply to firms that do not portray themselves to retail 
clients as “independent,” including vertically integrated financial firms. 
In considering the best way forward from a social point of view, a good starting point is to 
consider the following question: since the welfare cost of saving too little for retirement is 
much greater than the cost of saving too much, why are modern societies confronted with 
the former when self-interest should lead to the latter situation? Examination of the price 
elasticity of savings indicates that the behavioural responses to price incentives to saving 
are not particularly large.34 This relatively small impact on incremental savings suggests 
that, in the Canadian context, insufficient wealth to ensure well-being in retirement will not 
primarily result from a lack of financial incentives but from the consequence of inadequate 
competencies in the management of household finances accentuated by psychological 
and other factors not accounted for by standard theories about savings for retirement and 
policy solutions.35 Moreover, irrespective of the amount of savings Canadians accumulate 
during their active life, a large majority of households remain exposed to the vagaries of 
31 
Securities and Exchange Commission, “Mutual Fund Distribution Fees: Confirmations,” File No. SD7-15-10 (July 2010), 37.
32 
Diane Del Guercio, Jonathan Reuter and Paula A. Tkac, “Broker Incentives and Mutual Fund Market Segmentation” 
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010).
33 
Strategic Insight, “A Perspective on the Evolution in Structure, Investor Demand, Distribution, Pricing, and Shareholders’ 
Total Costs in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry” (2012), 23.
34 
B.C. Madrian, “Matching Contribution and Savings Outcomes: A Behavioural Economics Perspective,” in Matching 
Contributions for Pensions: A Review of International Experience, ed., R. Hinz et al. (Washington, D.C,.: Word Bank, 
2013), 289-310.
35 
Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge (New York: Penguin Books, 2009).
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financial markets36 and can expect dramatic fluctuations in fortunes between members of 
a cohort unless they adopt investment strategies that reduce the impact of market shocks.37 
Consideration must also be given to the fact that, as a growing number of Canadians reach 
retirement age, the expert-advice needs shift to how retirees use their savings and draw 
down their wealth in retirement.38 
Hence, the key issues raised by a mandatory unbundling policy are whether their 
implementation will: (i) bring about the desired change in behaviour; (ii) broaden access to 
financial advice; (iii) reduce or contain the cost of financial advice and, more generally, (iv) 
help Canadians accumulate more wealth than would be the case otherwise; and (v) assist 
retirees make an efficient draw-down of their wealth. That the imposition of such a rule 
on the Canadian industry would effectively yield the expected benefits is not a foregone 
conclusion.
3. THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF PROFESSIONAL FINANCIAL ADVICE
In her pioneering work, Lusardi39 provides strong evidence that wealth holdings were 
much improved by specific planning activities and, conversely, that households that gave 
little thought to retirement had far lower wealth than those who planned for it, even after 
controlling for many socio-demographic factors. Individuals “with a high propensity to 
plan not only accumulate more wealth, but also save more than those with a low such 
propensity.”40 
Venti and Wise have shown that “the differences in saving choices among households with 
similar lifetime earnings lead to vastly different levels of asset accumulation by the time 
retirement age approaches.”41 The capacity to plan for retirement is strongly associated 
36 
Retirement income from DC plans and financial savings are highly dependent on the date of retirement or that of conversion 
of financial wealth into an income stream since market values are cyclical. According to recent calculations by the OEDC, 
assuming the same percentage of salary as pension contributions, the initial pension as a proportion of final salary of an 
American worker retiring at the peak of the dot-com boom was about 52 per cent compared to around 20 per cent for those 
retiring in 2012. Similar gyrations occur in all market economies. Investment schemes said to be more appropriate for 
retirement savings, such as target-date funds, remain subject to the effects of market volatility. For instance, according 
to Morningstar, the average value of U.S. target-date funds fell by 23 per cent in 2008 following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. In a nutshell, the glide path to retirement income may be much steeper for some than others depending solely on 
the state of financial markets at the date of retirement.
37 
P. Antolin, S. Payet and J. Yermo, “Assessing Default Investment Strategies in Defined Contribution Pension Plans” (OECD, 
2010).
38 
James Poterba, Steven Venti and David Wise, “The Composition and Draw-Down of Wealth in Retirement,” NBER 
Working Paper 17536 (October 2011).
39 
Annamaria Lusardi, “Information, Expectations, and Savings,” in Behavioural Dimensions of Retirement Economics, ed. 
Henry Aaron (New York: Brookings Institution/Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 81-115; Annamaria Lusardi, “Explaining 
Why so Many Households Do Not Save,” mimeo (University of Chicago, 2000).
40 
John Ameriks, Andrew Caplin and John Leahy, “Wealth Accumulation and the Propensity to Plan,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (2003): 1008-1009.
41 
Steven Venti and David Wise, “Choice, Chance, and Wealth Dispersion at Retirement,” NBER Working Paper No. 7521 
(2000), 35.
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with financial literacy and sophistication42 and closely tied to working with an adviser.43 A 
large proportion of households are unable to determine how current savings are likely to 
translate into income in retirement on account of limited financial literacy. According to a 
recent survey, only one-fourth of Canadian adults who are not yet retired have determined 
the amount of money they will need in retirement.44 Surveys also show that households 
substantially underestimate the amount they need to save to achieve their anticipated annual 
household retirement income.45 
Sticking to a plan requires a long-term perspective and a disciplined approach that eludes a 
large proportion of the population. Left on their own, individual investors are more likely 
to invest inefficiently (inappropriate asset mix, under-diversification, excessive trading, 
pro-cyclical tendency, etc.) and either not take the investment risk that is needed to achieve 
at least their long-term savings goals46 or fall prey to the allure of market-timing and the 
chase for performance. Kinniry et al. suggest that the counteracting influence of financial 
advisers to these emotional urges “could be the largest potential value-add of the tools 
available to advisers.”47 Their conclusions are supported by numerous academic studies 
finding that financial advice leads to better investment practices by retail investors.48
In terms of adequacy of retirement income, it is the wealth a household needs to accumulate 
to support the expected level and pattern of consumption at retirement that matters. 
This is where financial advice makes a difference through the influence it exerts on the 
establishment of financial goals and the discipline to follow through with appropriate 
savings and investment practices. Using the 2004 and the 2008 waves of the U.S. National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Martin and Finkle found that, after controlling for socio-
economic status, households that used a financial adviser and calculated retirement needs 
“saved $233,617 more in retirement wealth than households that did not have a plan” and 
“generated more than 50 percent greater savings than those who estimated retirement 
needs on their own without the help of a planner.”49 In Canada, the results of a rigorous 
econometric study show that, on average, individual investors assisted by a financial 
42 
David, Boisclair, Annamaria Lusardi and Pierre-Carl Michaud, “Financial Literacy and Retirement Planning in Canada,” 
NBER Working Paper No. 20297 (July 2014).
43 
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Economic Issues 32, 4 (2011): 625-643.
44 
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45 
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46 
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2014), 16.
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adviser accumulate significantly more financial assets than did non-advised respondents 
with comparable age, income levels and other socioeconomic characteristics. This benefit of 
financial advice grows with the length of time households have received advice: after four 
to six years, the advised households have accumulated 1.58 times the amount accumulated 
by non-advised households; after 15 years, the difference has increased to 2.73 times.50 
The contribution of financial advisers to the propensity to save and, thus, accumulate much 
larger financial asset balances, is illustrated in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2 MEDIAN FINANCIAL ASSET LEVELS HELD BY CANADIAN HOUSEHOLDS
Non-Advised Advised
Median financial assets $24,000 $101,000
Mean financial assets $93,384 $193,772
Source: Montmarquette and Viennot-Briot, 2012. 
3.1. A quantitative assessment
The Conference Board of Canada simulated the economic impact over the long term of a 
scenario whereby 10 per cent of Canadians without a financial adviser obtained financial 
advice and adopted the saving pattern of presently “advised” investors. The simulations 
provide additional evidence of the contribution of financial advice to retirement readiness: a 
10 per cent increase in the advised population would cause annual household net savings in 
2025 to be $812 million larger than in 2014, the base year. 
FIGURE 3 INCOME AND SAVINGS CHARACTERISTICS, BY AGE COHORT





















With a financial adviser 49 78,622 10.6 87,862 11.4 88,850 13.7
Non-advised 44 63,018 8.5 66,129 8.2 65,882 9.2
Non-advised, active trader 6 77,381 12.6 88,634 14.0 86,653 14.1
Source: The Conference Board of Canada, Boosting Retirement Readiness, 2014. 
The Conference Board estimates that five years after the increase in the advised population, 
real GDP and real disposable income are augmented, “business investment is boosted” and 
“potential output is higher over the long-term, representing a permanent increase in income 
and profits in the economy.”51 These results are consistent with those obtained in Australia. 
A study of the key economic implications of an additional five per cent of Australians 
receiving financial advice, concludes that within a five-year period it would result in a 0.3 
per cent of GDP gain in national saving compared to what would otherwise be the case.52
50 
Montmarquette and Viennot-Briot, “Econometric Models,” 9.
51 
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13
The Conference Board simulations provide an indication of the magnitude of the welfare 
cost caused by a shrinking of the “advised” population. The consequence of a prohibition 
on embedded and trailing fees is likely to reduce by 20 to 30 per cent the number of 
individual investors that obtain or will seek professional financial advice.53 Such a 
contraction is two to three times the size of the enlargement of the “advised” population 
postulated for the simulations; it is not unreasonable to suggest that the shrinking of the 
advised population would have roughly symmetrical economic costs to the estimated 
benefits stemming from a proportional increase in the advised population.
4. TRUST: A KEY DETERMINANT OF THE DEMAND FOR PROFESSIONAL  
 FINANCIAL ADVICE
Trust is a key determinant of the engagement by individual investors in financial markets. 
Consumer surveys reveal that finding a financial adviser that is trustworthy is consumers’ 
first priority in their search for an adviser (followed by competence and a proven track 
record). Consumers rely on several mechanisms to gauge the degree of trust they can place 
in the quality of expert services and confide in an adviser. The brand name, relationship 
and service-quality factors that are generalizable across products and services offerings 
have been shown to be salient factors in the choice of financial intermediaries. Securities 
commissions convey a powerful signal about the quality and professionalism of the 
financial firms and financial advisers they regulate; an implicit representation that they will 
be dealt with fairly and in accordance with the standards of the industry. The existence of 
a regulatory body that provides oversight to a profession is a signal to consumers that they 
need not spend resources on costly monitoring in order to reduce self-serving behaviour by 
the adviser and that there is a mechanism for redress if that behaviour were to occur.
Trust is an essential determinant of the quality of a relationship;54 it generates higher 
levels of co-operation between a supplier and its customers, leads a supplier to exert more 
efforts on behalf of his clients, enhances the credibility of the supplier, generates buy-in of 
recommendations and it shifts the focus of the relationship from the short to the long term.55 
Trust is particularly important in relationships where risk and information asymmetry are 
present since it mitigates opportunistic behaviours on the part of the supplier and is key to 
overall satisfaction.56 Two factors are particularly relevant with respect to retail financial-
services-consumption decisions. First, trust has a beneficial impact on a customer’s overall 
evaluation of a financial services relationship; second, trust plays a key role in reducing 
perceived risk and simplifying choices. The two are clearly interdependent. Trust — trust 
53 
Nick Chater, Steffen Huck and Roman Inderst, “Consumer Decision-Making in Retail Investment Services: A Behavioural 
Economics Perspective” (European Commission, 2010).
54 
J. Singh and D. Sirdeshmukh, “Agency and Trust Mechanisms in Consumer Satisfaction and Loyalty Judgments,” Journal 
of the Academy of Marketing Science (2000).
55 
A. Sunikka, L. Kapanen-Peura and A. Raijas, “Empirical Investigation into the Multi-faceted Trust in the Wealth 
Management Context,” International Journal of Bank Marketing (2010); C. Ennew and H. Sekhon, “Measuring Trust in 
Financial Services: The Trust Index,” Consumer Policy Review (2007); P. Cox, “Should a financial service provider care 
about trust? An Empirical Study of Retail Saving and Investment Allocations,” Journal of Financial Services Marketing 
(2007).
56 
D. Thom et al., “Patient Trust in the Physical: Relationship to Patient Requests,” Family Practice (2002).
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in advice and trust in consumer rights — is an essential ingredient that exerts a significant 
influence on the willingness of people to seek advice even though they are unable to 
ascertain whether or not the recommendations are the best in the circumstances. 
A large European survey provides evidence that “households with lower financial capability 
need to trust financial advice in order to invest in stocks.”57 The results of an extensive 
survey of individual investors who have and do not have a financial adviser are revealing: 
having a financial adviser significantly increases: (i) the trust towards a financial adviser 
(about 30 per cent more likely than a similar non-advised respondents); (ii) the confidence 
levels towards financial advisers (70.8 per cent have high confidence versus 32.1 per cent 
for non-advised respondents; and, (iii) significantly increases the investor’s confidence that 
he or she will have enough money to retire comfortably.58 These results buttress those of 
annual surveys of mutual fund investors that indicate they trust their adviser to give them 
sound advice (94 per cent) and believe they obtain better returns on their investments than 
they would otherwise (90 per cent).59 
The trust individual investors place in their financial adviser and their firm cannot be 
dismissed by asserting that “they do not know better” or that we are presented with a 
classic case of cognitive dissonance. A recent survey of U.S. financial consumers designed 
to identify the factors that lead to paying for professional financial advice and the type of 
services purchased showed that financial consumers who pay for comprehensive financial 
advice are predominantly middle-aged, college educated, financially knowledgeable and 
wealthy.60 These results are inconsistent with the argument that the level of trust observed 
through the surveys simply suggests that financial consumers are naturally trusting and 
credulous toward their financial adviser. In the discussions on embedded mutual fund fees, 
the near exclusive focus on answers to surveys of investors concerning their familiarity 
with the form of remuneration of their financial adviser misrepresents the full extent of 
the investor-financial adviser relationship. Among the factors that have an impact on the 
level of trust exhibited by retail investors, the financial adviser’s compensation does not 
produce statistically significant results.61 The high levels of confidence, satisfaction and 
trust expressed by “advised” investors are the relevant indicators of the value they ascribe 
to their relationship with a financial adviser. The role of trust in reducing the incidence of 
self-serving behaviours needs to be explicitly recognized. This also makes it imperative 
that constant care be taken to ensure that investors’ trust in a competent and professional 
financial advice industry is not misplaced. 
57 
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4.1. The principal-agent conundrum
It is unreasonable to expect no welfare losses from the delegation of decision-making to 
professional advisers. There is no denying that the principal-agent relationship between a 
financial adviser and his clients expose them to both adverse selection and moral hazard. 
The friction inherent to a principal-agent relationship, the incentives embedded in the 
remuneration structure, whichever its form, and the information asymmetry between the 
parties combine to dissipate some of the gains from professional financial advice that would 
accrue under aseptic conditions. 
There are myriad situations where professionals face conflicts of interest when they advise 
clients on whether they should pursue one or another course of action. The most commonly 
prescribed remedy to mitigate the risks stemming from “conflicted” situations is disclosure. 
In certain circumstances, this “solution” may have perverse effects. For instance, it has 
been shown that people generally do not discount advice from biased advisers as much 
as they should, even when advisers’ conflicts of interest are disclosed, and that disclosure 
may increase the bias in advice because — caveat emptor — it provides the advisers with 
the moral licence to engage in self-interested behaviour, thereby exacerbating biases.62 
Subsequent studies show that other institutional factors, including sanctions, can effectively 
mitigate these effects of disclosure.63 
Clearly, the legal regime that governs the conduct of financial intermediaries and “approved 
persons” in retail markets, the protection it affords financial consumers and the efficacy 
of the regulatory apparatus in ensuring compliance with the rules and redress, when 
needed, greatly influence the beliefs of financial consumers in the fairness of the “rules of 
the game” and, hence, their level of trust. This explains, in part, why civil and common 
law standards exemplified by the “shingle theory” under U.S. federal securities law and 
the “holding out” concept under common law, impose on financial intermediaries more 
stringent legal responsibilities of care and loyalty to their clients than those that govern 
ordinary contracts.64 
Canadian securities legislation and case law impose a statutory duty on retail client advisers 
to deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with their clients. These statutory obligations 
impose on financial advisers and registered firms a duty of care, which is comprised of 
“know your product” and “know your client” obligations, along with fair and reasonable 
compensation. The duty of loyalty encompasses the disclosure of the terms and conditions 
of the relationship and material conflicts of interest and their resolution in a manner 
consistent with the interest of the customer. These obligations are detailed in securities 
62 
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regulations and the self-regulatory organizations’ requirements, including the extension 
of the duty of loyalty to the client beyond the initial purchase, sale or recommendation 
of any security that is unique to Canada.65 Commentators have argued that the “client 
relationship model” that codifies the duties of Canadian financial advisers and financial 
intermediaries vis-à-vis their clients is lacking.66 It remains that, when considered in its 
totality, the fiduciary duties imposed on financial advisers and intermediaries by Canadian 
law, regulation and case law are significantly more extensive and exacting than the 
corresponding regimes in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.67
The conflict-of-interest criticism levied against the bundling of financial advice with 
financial products may be preoccupied more with form than with the outcome.68 The 
incidence of churning of mutual fund accounts illustrates the point. A common view is that 
when commissions are paid to a financial adviser on a transaction basis, the remuneration 
formula incentivizes the adviser to trade more often than is warranted. Hence, the converse 
should hold that when the remuneration of a financial adviser is on the value of the assets 
under management (AUM) the incentive to needlessly trade mutual funds or other financial 
products is eliminated and the risk of account churning substantially reduced. 
The evidence does not support these conclusions: fee-for-advice account structures 
demonstrate higher-than-average asset velocity. Strategic Insights reports that “mutual 
funds held within commission-based platforms show asset turnover (i.e., redeeming one 
fund and using the proceeds to purchase another fund) in line with industry averages in 
recent years. In contrast, fee-for-advice platforms experience higher asset turnover.”69 A 
number of academic studies have concluded that higher asset velocity correlates with lower 
investment results. Accordingly, “this higher asset turnover typical within fee-for-advice 
accounts raises concerns about investment results, as compared to lower turnover ‘buy-and-
hold’ strategies.”70 Within financial institutions and professional organizations, conflicts 
of interest infrequently materialize in corrupt actions — the domain of enforcement; 
rather, biased advice is generally the result of unintentional and unconscious motivations.71 
Through an analysis of a sample of 12,000 individual investment accounts for a 34-month 
period at a large retail German bank, Bluethgen et al. conclude that their “empirical 
65 
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evidence is broadly in line with honest financial advice.”72 Examining the investment 
portfolios of Canadian households at three large Canadian financial institutions, Foester 
et al. found that the composition of the advisers’ portfolio “is far and away the strongest 
predictor of the risk taken in their client’s portfolios even after controlling for advisor 
and client characteristics.”73 In a study of 401k plans in the United States, Dvorak reaches 
a similar conclusion: the composition of client 401k plans was similar to their financial 
adviser’s plan.74 No doubt, such a projection of an adviser’s risk preferences on his clients 
raises questions about the suitability of the advice in all cases; however, it does not support 
the contention that his advice was driven by ulterior motives. 
The above observations are consistent with the findings of several academic studies that 
there exists little empirical evidence to support the claim that fee-based pricing promotes 
behaviour more aligned with clients’ interests75 and it suggests that, when evidence does 
exist, concerns about commission-based pricing may be overstated and may not be as 
problematic as predicted.76 Weinstein concludes from his review of the literature that “it 
is not yet clear whether moving from commission-based to asset-based compensation will 
result in a net improvement in the overall return to the investor.”77 Very little is known 
“about individual responsiveness to financial advice outside an environment with moral 
hazard”78 and what is known about advice taking and receiving does not favour the 
superiority of the neutral advice hypothesis.79 One important factor is that financial advisers 
want to sustain their business over time; the repeated-game nature of the relationship 
provides an incentive to offer accurate advice to their clients or, at the very least, not to 
knowingly provide biased information.80 Moreover, the right of investors in mutual funds to 
demand repayment of their investment at current net asset value at the end of each trading 
day carries profound and effective governance consequences. Cast in a broader context, 
Samantha Lee finds that contrary to frequent assertions, advisers provided more optimal 
advice in asymmetric knowledge contexts than in symmetric knowledge contexts and as 
task complexity increased.81
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5. THE PECULIAR ECONOMIC NATURE OF FINANCIAL ADVICE
The success of Canadian households in accumulating enough wealth despite the costs 
associated with the management of individual accounts is critical to the effectiveness of 
voluntary retirement savings programs and the long-term performance and resilience of the 
Canadian retirement income system. Given the empirical evidence that individual investors 
relying on the support of financial advisers are, on average, more successful than are non-
advised investors in accumulating and managing their financial assets,82 and that the socio-
economic benefits stemming from broad access to formal advice sources are considerable, 
a key question arises: Under what conditions are the supply of and demand for regulated 
financial advice most likely to be socially optimal? 
Investment advisory services differ from consumer goods and services because they are 
abstract and there exists an asymmetric information discrepancy between the buyer and 
the seller, who is deemed to be a subject matter expert, whereas consumers are unable to 
evaluate confidently, even after repeated purchases, the quality and the reasonableness 
of the cost of the professional services they obtain. Are good financial returns the result 
of luck or of investment savvy? How confident can an investor be in the explanation that 
inactivity was the best strategy since he cannot distinguish “actively doing nothing” 
from “failing to do something”? The uncertainty is about the value and the quality of the 
services. In economic terms, financial advice falls within the category of “credence goods.” 
This characteristic is precisely the crux of the matter: the information costs to evaluate 
“credence goods” are always significantly higher than for search (“normal”) goods, often 
unbearably high.
The “credence good” nature of financial advice has significant consequences for consumer 
behaviour and, consequently, on the suppliers, the financial intermediary firms. Individuals 
with higher education and income, financially sophisticated and with larger amounts of 
financial assets, exhibit a much greater demand for advice from financial intermediaries — 
a rational outcome given that, for them, the opportunity cost of abstinence is much higher 
— whereas individuals who are non-financially literate and non-affluent are reluctant to 
seek financial advice.83 The latter, a large segment of investors, will resist paying upfront 
fees for financial advice because they do not understand what working with a financial 
adviser entails and they are unable to discern the benefits, which are abstract, delayed in 
time and with an uncertain outcome. Their attitude also reflects the fact that non-affluent 
households tend to equate financial advice with financial risk, which they avoid because 
they fear it. Viewed from their perspective, paying upfront for financial advice is equivalent 
to “locking in” a sure loss since they just can’t fathom the benefits. This loss aversion is 
compounded by the fact that financial planning involves a long-term time frame. Even 
though it is accurate, the warning “past performance does not guarantee future results” 
that accompanies mutual funds and similar financial products can hardly be considered 
an unabashed encouragement to incur the upfront cost. Consumer surveys confirm these 
observations. 
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A survey of Australian retail investors found that a substantial proportion were not 
prepared to pay for advice more than 10 per cent of the annual cost of providing the service 
and, if this was not possible, they would forgo the advice. The Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) reports that “a common attitude was that financial advice 
was too expensive when there were no guaranteed returns.”84 In the United Kingdom, 
studies seeking to understand financial consumers’ decision-making behaviour conclude 
that they are most reluctant to pay upfront for advice.85 Delmas-Marsalet had obtained 
similar results in France.86 A study involving retail investors from eight European countries 
found that between 26 to 30 per cent of respondents were unwilling to pay upfront for 
advice.87 In Canada, even though 94 per cent of Canadian mutual fund investors agreed 
that they trust their advisers to give them sound advice and 90 per cent agreed that they 
obtain better returns than they would if investing on their own,88 only 16 per cent indicated 
that they would continue their relationship with their financial adviser if a shift to a fee-for-
advice regime resulted in an upfront cost to them. The observed idiosyncrasies of individual 
investors are remarkably similar between countries, which suggests that they reflect innate 
human proclivities.
The fundamental issue is not that individual investors do not value financial advice; rather, 
it is the reluctance of a large segment of the retail market to pay for it upfront that needs 
to be addressed. In so doing, financial consumers may be much more rational than what 
they are given credit for: the quality of the information provided is shown to be enhanced 
when the compensation is contingent over time rather than paid concurrently with the 
transaction.89 The bundling of mutual funds with financial advice through embedded and 
trailing fees addresses this consumer reaction by establishing proportionality between the 
price of advice and the duration of the service.
5.1. The bundling of financial products with advisory services
The bundling of goods or services is a common practice in retail and industrial markets. 
A large body of marketing research shows that the complementarity of services offered 
in a bundle enhances its value for consumers, which far exceeds the strict additivity of 
individual component prices, particularly when the bundle reduces the real cost in time 
and efforts needed to select and purchase the items individually.90 Using paradigms 
in consumer behaviour, research focused on the psychological effects associated with 
bundling to empirically determine how it affects their valuation of the bundle and the 
magnitude of these effects reveals that the value consumers ascribe to bundling is generally 
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underestimated.91 These factors take additional prominence in the case of services, which, 
compared to goods, typically comprise more intangible elements and tend to be both more 
complex and more varied. 
The public goods nature of financial advice is another important characteristic. Since 
information is costly to produce but cheap to reproduce, a frequent market solution to 
protect the manufacturer of information-intensive products is tie-in sales where the 
information is bundled with an exclusive good. Vertical restraint practices, a form of 
bundling across the value chain common in several industries, are voluntarily adopted as 
a way to efficiently distribute products that require point-of-sale services.92 Their purpose 
is to induce desired dealer services and optimally compensate dealers for increases in 
sales where explicit contracts regarding detailed quality of services and performance are 
difficult to design because the heterogeneity of consumers’ demand makes it prohibitive 
for the manufacturer to monitor the conduct of retail activities. The common element in 
explanations of the efficiency of bundling arrangements is the recognition that the demand 
for the product or service at the retail level depends on factors other than price, a condition 
that characterizes the financial “advice” channels.93 However, if the manufacturer relies on 
a private-contract enforcement mechanism to ensure dealer adherence, then, a quasi-rent 
stream must exists to ensure the stability of the relationship.94 
Five major conclusions stemming from studies of bundling services with products are 
particularly relevant to the assessment of the practices observed in retail financial markets:
• Facilitating the investment process: Most individuals do not spend enough time 
— or do not want — to actually manage their investments. This behaviour can be 
explained by the fact that they often have limited financial assets or lack financial 
sophistication. Bundling saves them a lot of time and effort that, in most cases, they 
do not want to spend, lowers search costs and simplifies the investment process. It 
is therefore a rational decision for them to purchase a bundle — that is the financial 
product and financial advice paid through embedded fees — rather than the individual 
items separately.95
• Enlarging the market for financial advice: Individual investors acknowledge the 
need for and value of financial advice; a large number of them are simply not willing 
to pay for it outright and want its cost blended with other fees and spread over time. 
The bundling of advisory services with an investment product such as mutual funds 
is an effective response to legitimate consumer preferences, which, in addition, yields 
substantial social benefits in that it encourages and broadens access to professional 
financial advice.
• Exercising downward pressure of the price of financial advice: It is the fund 
manufacturers’ interest to enlarge the number of investors in their funds, an objective 
91 
Steven M. Shugan, “The Cost of Thinking,” Journal of Consumer Research (1980).
92 
Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy, “Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms,” Journal of Law and 
Economics XXXI, 2 (October 1988): 265-297.
93 
G.F. Mathewson and R. A. Winter, The Economics of Vertical Restraints in Distribution (1986).
94 
Klein and Murphy, “Vertical Restraints.” 
95 
Judy Harris and Edward A. Blair, “Consumer Preference for Product Bundles: The Role of Reduced Search Costs,” Journal 
of the Academy of Marketing Science (2006).
21
that differs in an important respect from those of distributors since it implies keeping 
a lid on the price charged to consumers. Critical for the stability of the arrangement 
between the two organizations, trailing fees paid to fund distributors is an effective 
mechanism through which a manufacturer can impose its pricing discipline for the 
advisory services provided to financial consumers by the distributor. Absent this 
constraint, the cost of financial advice for a majority of retail clients is bound to 
increase.
• Promoting accessibility to financial advice: The cost function for the distribution 
of financial products and financial advice activities is convex. In absence of bundling, 
the unavoidable consequence is that a combination of lower aggregate costs per 
investor and higher expected fee income will motivate financial firms (and the 
financial advisers in their employ) to target higher-net-worth investors and shun less 
wealthy households.96 This segmentation will be further accentuated by the fact that 
the potential for cross-selling financial products to retail customers of modest means 
is limited. The major casualty resulting from such a targeting process is the size of the 
advised population, which is caused to shrink considerably.
• Increasing consumer options: Bundling makes it easy to purchase the whole suite 
of services, if that is what a consumer is inclined to do. Others prefer unbundled 
services. Financial consumers who do not value or need financial advice have the 
ability to purchase mutual funds and other financial products through one or the 
other of the non-advice channels, including through the ubiquitous bank branches. 
The competition between distribution channels better serves the distinct needs and 
preferences of consumers. It also imposes on fund manufacturers the discipline to 
ensure that their offer responds to the wants of the different customer segments in 
terms of price, quality and performance.
6. THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL ADVICE PRICING STRUCTURES:  
 A SURVEY
Industry pricing structures tend to evolve until they reach an optimal balance between 
countervailing forces and, from thereon, remain in equilibrium unless a disruptive shock 
occurs. This has been the case for financial advice. Worldwide, this service has usually 
been paid for indirectly through embedded fees and commissions. The fact that “advice 
channels” have retained the dominant share of mutual fund retail markets in the face 
of robust competition from strong competing channels and credible financial-product 
alternatives constitutes solid evidence of the optimality of the bundle pricing structure for 
large segments of the retail market.
The bundling of financial advice with financial products such as mutual funds has a major 
impact on the structure of the industry, a consideration rarely addressed in the literature 
and policy debate. The efficiency of the arrangement allows the development and growth of 
a horizontal industry structure where product manufacturers and distributors are distinct 
organizations. From an economic and social point of view, the horizontal industry structure 




intermediaries is far superior to a vertically integrated structure where the great majority 
of financial advisers are limited to “selling” the financial products “manufactured” by their 
employer, in that it promotes market transparency, competition at both the product and 
distribution levels and a focus on investment performance.
The corporate interests of independent dealers and mutual fund manufacturers are not 
perfectly aligned. It is the mutual fund manufacturers’ interest to grow the value of the 
assets in their funds, which, in practice, means increasing the number of investors. To 
achieve this objective, mutual fund fees must be set at a level low enough, and structured 
in such a way as to not to discourage non-affluent investors. For their part, dealers need 
to ensure that the marginal cost of serving a new retail client is covered. The embedded 
fees with a trailer-commission approach is an efficient arrangement to reconcile these 
conflicting objectives since this pricing formula circumvents the main resistance of a large 
segment of retail investors to invest through the advice channel and provides the dealer 
with a stable and adequate stream of revenues. This equilibrium state can be shattered by 
major changes in the industry structure or by regulations. This has happened by regulatory 
fiat in the United Kingdom, Australia and The Netherlands and, as a result of market forces, 
in the United States.
6.1. The United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued in March 
2010, as part of its Retail Distribution Review (RDR), final rules and guidance on the 
implementation of the “adviser charging” system with an effective implementation date of 
Jan. 1, 2013. These rules prohibit the payment of fees or commissions to distributors set 
by financial-product manufacturers or otherwise embedded in the cost of the product. A 
companion rule raised the minimum education standards for all actual and future financial 
advisers. One of the stated aims of the RDR was to increase the number of consumers 
that sought regulated professional advice, alongside an emphasis on the need to save for 
retirement. The FSA was warned that, while commission-based firms cross-subsidized 
between products and customers, fee-based financial intermediaries were more likely to 
have income or asset thresholds below which they will not accept a new customer, would 
end unprofitable client relationships and would align and allocate the resources of their 
business depending on the revenue potential of clients. The expressions of concern that “the 
outcomes of the RDR will change fundamentally remuneration processes in the market for 
financial advice, as well as potential access to affordable independent advice for many” 
were recurrent.97 Another concern was the increase in the regulatory burden. The total net 
present value of the incremental compliance costs due to the increased level of monitoring 
and intervention mandated by the new rules was estimated to lie between £1.4 and £1.7 
billion.98 
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Publication of the RDR rules set in motion three types of dynamic responses, which, 
combined, had the effect of reducing the number of registered financial advisers from 
40,566 at the end of 2011 to 31,132 in December 2012, a level that has not varied much 
since. Despite a contraction of about 9,400 financial advisers, the average number of 
clients per adviser has remained close to 200, a good measure of the number of individual 
investors that were orphaned by their financial adviser during the transition phase.







Investment Manager Other Total
2011 25,616 8,658 4,044 0 2,249 40,566
31/12/2012 20,453 4,810 2,043 1,435 2,269 31,312
31/10/2014 21,496 3,182 1,906 1,698 2,871 31,153
Source: APFA, The Financial Adviser Market In Numbers, Edition 3.0, Figure 6, 2015. 
The most impactful response to the RDR rules came from banks and building societies. 
Their strategic review of the business led them to conclude that, taking into account the 
reputational risks associated with retail complaints, no cost-effective solution acceptable 
to mainstream investors would allow them to provide quality financial-advice services and 
cover the added administrative and compliance costs imposed by the regulatory regime. In 
the span of a few months following the publication of the adviser charging rule, Barclays 
withdrew from the retail-investors-advice market, HSBC withdrew advice in its retail bank 
for those with less than £50,000 in savings or investments with the bank, or £100,000 of 
annual income, RBS closed its financial-advice arm and Lloyds Banking Group announced 
that it would offer personal financial advice only to those with more than £100,000 in 
investible assets, adding that those with fewer investible assets “will be able to access a 
non-advised service.” In early 2013, Bank Santander and AXA exited the market. The 
resulting contraction of the number of financial advisers in the retail banking channel 
during the months preceding the entry into effect of the RDR rule was about 45 per cent of 
the total adviser complement.
The second response stemmed from a combination of supply and demand factors at the 
level of financial adviser firms. Unable to afford the additional compliance costs, the 
independent financial adviser (IFA) firms segmented their client base. The level of assets 
needed to make a retail account commercially viable for a financial adviser under the new 
regime was estimated at about £100,000. They then proceeded to systematically prune 
smaller retail accounts for which the cost of advice was too expensive for the client or 
unprofitable to service. This was accompanied by a concomitant reduction in the number of 
financial advisers in their employ. This contraction was further accentuated by the reaction 
of many individual investors who chose to eschew financial advice rather than pay upfront 
for the service. Industry data reveal that the opening of investment accounts with assets of 
less than £100,000 dropped by half between 2011 and 2014.99
The third response was the decision by a significant number of older advisers to exit the 
trade rather than submitting to the new certification requirements. Seeking “to maintain 
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standards of professionalism that inspire consumer confidence and build trust” is a 
legitimate and important policy objective. The effectiveness of such a policy does not 
depend on severing the financial link between product manufacturers and distributors 
and the disallowance of embedded fees. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) no doubt 
accentuated the retirement wave by banning embedded fees.
The financial intermediaries’ response to the unbundling rule led to the creation of an 
“advice gap,” considered to be “the biggest failing of the RDR.”100 Testifying before the 
U.K. House of Commons work and pension committee, the chief executive of the FCA 
admitted that the “advice gap” and the number of people being orphaned by their advisers 
was a “concern.” In his words, trying to measure “something that consumers are not 
doing” is a difficult task! The FCA commissioned two independent studies101 to estimate 
the “advice gap” arising from the RDR. The analyses relied on narrow definitions of the 
demand for and the nature of financial advice. The need for financial advice does not 
necessarily translate into demand for or supply of such services. For demand to crystalize, 
willingness to pay is paramount; conversely, for supply to rise to satisfy demand, adequate 
revenues are necessary. The analyses’ conclusion that the co-called “advice gap” was 
overblown is contradicted by subsequent developments. 
The growth of the “advice gap” was acknowledged by Her Majesty’s Treasury and the 
FCA in the terms of reference of Financial Advice Market Review launched in August 
2015 to examine, among its five objectives, “the advice gap for those people who want to 
work hard, do the right thing and get on in life but do not have significant wealth.”102 In 
October 2015, the FCA parliamentary oversight committee issued a report stating that the 
range of financial advice support on offer “in the affordable middle ground is woefully 
inadequate.”103 Fundscape estimates that the percentage of the U.K. population receiving 
financial advice fell from between 10 and 13 per cent in the pre-RDR environment to seven 
to 10 per cent in the post-RDR advice model. 
In the final analysis, the net result of the U.K. policy to ban the bundling of financial advice 
with financial products is a market where a larger number of consumers do not “have 
their needs and wants addressed,”104 where access to regulated financial advice by non-
affluent individuals is priced out of the market and where the less financially sophisticated 
individuals are pushed towards the execution-only channel. The proportion of financial-
product sold on a non-advised basis has grown from 33 per cent pre-RDR to 67 per cent.105 
Individuals “going the non-advised route” lose not only the benefits of personal advice, 
they also forego the protection available to individuals relying on financial advice who 
have mechanisms to complain and seek redress if they believe the financial products they 
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bought are not suitable for their goals and circumstances. Such recourse is not available 
for “self mis-selling.” This in turn has prompted the Financial Services Consumer Panel 
(FSCP), a U.K. Government agency, to call on the FCA “to take immediate action to protect 
consumers who buy their retirement products through non-advice sales.”106 
The “advice gap” is bound to further expand since, come 2016, firms (and advisers) will 
need to sever the trailing-fees arrangements they are earning on the assets investors 
have acquired prior to 2013. Industry sources report that in 2014, pre-RDR ongoing fees 
accounted for 20 per cent of IFA income. In many cases, these accounts are not large 
enough to be commercially viable in the new environment but continue to be served 
because of the recurring trail income they generate.107
6.2. Same Policy, Same Effects: Australia and The Netherlands
The adoption of Australia’s Future of Financial Advice (FOFA) legislation prohibiting 
embedded and trailing commissions on investment and superannuation products (except 
for life insurance products, which are not subject to the rules) that became compulsory 
on July 1, 2013, had effects similar to those observed in the United Kingdom. Following 
FOFA, financial intermediaries proceeded to segment the retail market, the number of 
financial advisers declined and there has been an increase in fixed fees paid by retail 
clients.108 According to John Brogden, chief executive of the Financial Services Council 
of Australia, “there has been a concentration and that concentration will only continue.”109 
The reason given by Australia’s Financial System Inquiry to exempt life insurance from the 
ban is highly relevant to the situation that characterizes the Canadian market for retirement 
savings: “At this stage, the Inquiry does not recommend removing all commissions, as 
some consumers may not purchase life insurance if the advice involves an upfront fee.”110
It is significant that these structural adjustments to the new regulatory regime have 
occurred despite the fact that trailing commissions and incentive payments for business 
written prior to July 2013 were grandfathered and can continue into the future unless the 
arrangement is terminated by either the client or the adviser. 
In the Netherlands, the prohibition on tied commissions applied to a broad range of 
“financial” brokers. In the retail financial advice market, a pattern similar to the one in the 
United Kingdom was observed: banks have moved upmarket, leading to the creation of 
an “advice gap” as a result of low- and middle-income investors orphaned by their adviser 
withdrawing from the market because of their reluctance to pay upfront for advice. The 
Financieele Dagblad, a financial-services expertise centre that has been involved in the 
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elaboration of the regulations, anticipated a large reduction in the number of independent 
financial intermediaries. The full impact of the restrictions on commission payments 
remains to be assessed, the Authority for the Financial Markets having decided to wait until 
2017 to conduct its post-implementation review.
6.3. The United States
In the United States, the top five investment banks (i.e., the distributors), account for 
about 18 per cent of the total assets under management (AUM) of the U.S. adviser-sold 
fund industry.111 This gave them enough market power to discard the embedded-fees 
arrangement in favour of an asset-based compensation model. A direct consequence of this 
corporate policy is to prevent fund manufacturers from establishing fees at levels below 
the ones large fund distributors can command on the basis of their strong retail market 
position. The asset-based-fee approach also serves their strategic intent to dampen the 
volatility of revenues arising from a business model based on point-of-sale commissions. It 
allows the adoption of a pricing strategy calibrated to weed out smaller accounts and grow 
the business with more affluent financial consumers owning large AUM accounts. As the 
value of AUM is much more stable, tying financial advisers compensation to the value of 
assets serves corporate purpose well as an incentive to grow the core AUM and stability of 
revenues.
The U.S. market provides a strong indication that individual investors have a propensity 
to shun upfront fee-only compensation for financial advice. Created in 1983, the National 
Association of Personal Financial Advisers (NAPFA) admits only financial advisers 
working exclusively on a direct-fee-compensation basis.112 NAPFA counts 2,400 members 
compared to about 150,000 financial advisers in the securities industry.
6.4. The effect of unbundling on market transparency and price  
 competition
The contention that unbundling the price of financial advice from that of funds is necessary  
to inform individual investors about the main characteristics and costs of the financial  
products and services they purchase and to enable investors to judge if those products and  
services are suitable for them overlooks essential points. First, shopping and investment  
is about choices between options, which implies comparisons and induces search costs.  
Regulations should aim at reducing the latter in order to facilitate comparisons and lead  
to better-informed decisions. Experience shows that unbundling the cost of financial advice 
111 
The top five U.S. firms are J.P. Morgan & Co., Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley Smith 
Barney and Citigroup.
112 
NAPFA defines a fee-only financial adviser as one who is compensated solely by the client with neither the adviser nor 
any related party receiving compensation contingent on the purchase or sale of a financial product, such as commissions, 
rebates, awards, finder’s fees, bonuses or other forms of compensation from others as a result of a client’s implementation of 
the individual’s planning recommendations.
27
from that of financial products produces the opposite effect as it makes accurate 
comparisons of total cost of ownership between financial intermediaries inaccessible to 
individual investors. Comparability is a necessary condition for market efficiency.113 
Second, industry-wide cost transparency is required to exert effective price competition 
and reduce price distortion. Even when well informed about the price charged on their 
individual accounts, retail investors do not possess enough influence on an individual 
basis to bend the sales and pricing policies of well-established financial organizations. The 
content of industry-wide reports on mutual fund fees and expenses between Canada and the 
United States and the recent experience in the United Kingdom following the adoption of 
the “adviser charging” rule confirm the general validity of this observation. 
In retail markets, competitive pressure is exerted by the combined effect of customers and 
competitors seemingly acting in concert in reaction to public information concerning the 
price and quality of services (or products) of a given firm. This was recently demonstrated 
in a study concerning health-care pricing in the United States. Even though patients with 
health insurance are mostly insulated from actual medical costs and individuals generally 
feel that more expensive care reflects better quality, price transparency is shown to exert 
effective market pressure on prices, reducing the average price of care by about seven per 
cent. The decline occurred soon after the pricing information became publicly available 
online and remained relatively constant thereafter.114 Similarly, in the financial advice 
market, “supply-side competition through commissions adds efficiency” that benefits 
financial consumers.115 
In the United States, the unbundled fee-based model is the rule for about 80 per cent of 
the gross sales of mutual funds to retail accounts. Since U.S. dealer firms distributing 
mutual funds pursue different pricing strategies and tend not to disclose publicly the actual 
charges they demand from their customers, detailed fund distribution costs (and fees) are 
not widely available and, except for the portion paid through a 12b-1 fee, are not included 
in the total expense ratio (TER) of the funds. In contrast, the total embedded fee structure 
(including trailing commissions and applicable taxes) incurred by Canadian investors is 
included in the management expense ratio (MER). The assessment of Strategic Investor 
is unambiguous: “the asset-based charges levied within fee-based programs, at times an 
overlooked component of total shareholder cost for mutual fund investors, are disclosed 
to and paid by each individual investor, but are not easily compared across the industry. 
In comparison, mutual fund expenses are transparent, publicly disclosed, and easy to 
compare across the industry for similarly invested funds.”116 Consequently, the TER widely 
distributed by third parties such as Morningstar considerably underestimates the total 
113 
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cost incurred by U.S. investors. Morningstar’s proviso that “the investor in a lower-cost 
fund may pay an additional fee to an adviser which is not considered in Morningstar’s 
calculations” does not eliminate the problem but rather confirms that essential information 
is truncated from the public information it conveys with regard to the total cost that U.S. 
individual investors incur when purchasing mutual funds through the “advice” channel. But 
this is precisely the point; market transparency is compromised. 
The market dynamics unleashed by a structural shift that separates the provision of 
financial advice from the sale of financial products tend to benefit financial intermediaries 
at the expense of individual investors.117 The lack of industry-wide transparency on the 
total cost of ownership lessens scrutiny on fees and the market pressure to keep costs 
within the bounds robust competition would allow. U.S. broker-dealers acknowledge that 
their revenues generated in commission-based platforms are lower than in a fee-for-advice 
platform that incites them to promote AUM-based-fee relationships. Strategic Insight 
concludes that “in total, the unbundling of fees has resulted in an increase in the total 
shareholder costs for many mutual fund investors — with such increases amplified due to 
tax considerations at times.”118 The finding of Investor Economics concerning the evolution 
of the cost of ownership of mutual funds in the United States confirms Strategic Insight’s 
conclusion “that a move to unbundled fee-for-advice models has not resulted in a reduction 
of investor costs of mutual fund ownership.”119
The same occurred in the United Kingdom following the adoption of regulations 
imposing the fee-for-advice regime on the financial industry. In 2014, the average revenue 
generated per financial adviser amounted to £107,166 compared to £90,197 in 2012 with a 
corresponding increase in pre-tax gross margin at financial adviser firms. This increase 
occurred even though the average number of clients per adviser has not changed. Average 
pre-tax profits of financial adviser firms are higher than what they had been in the years 
prior to 2013.120 Market pricing is now blurred, rendering it very cumbersome — if not 
impossible — to make comparisons between firms.
The RDR post-implementation review indicates that the price for retail investment products 
has been falling whereas the cost of financial advice increased. However, the evolution of 
the total cost could not be determined: “The ranges in pre — and post — RDR estimates 
of platform, product and adviser payments, and the various ways in which these feature in 
different investments, means it is not yet clear whether declines in product and platform 
prices are more of less offset by increases in advice costs.”121 In Canada, we know that 
between 2011 and 2014, the asset-weighted MER of long-term funds, which includes the 
commission paid to financial advisers, declined from 2.08 per cent to 2.03 per cent.122
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The powerful influence of industry-wide price transparency on the structure of an industry 
should not be overlooked. Mutual fund expense ratios vary inversely with fund assets. The 
sheer size of the U.S. mutual funds industry provides fund manufacturers and distributors 
opportunities to reap the benefits of economies of scale that are generally out-of-reach for 
the Canadian industry. Despite this handicap, net of taxes, comparisons of the average 
total cost of ownership of mutual funds in Canada and the United States in the “advice” 
channels are similar (i.e., 2.02 per cent versus 2.0 per cent), except for accounts with less 
than $300,000 in assets where “the average Canadian mutual funds cost of ownership in 
advice channels can be lower than the U.S.”123 The Canadian practice where distribution 
and financial advice costs are included in mutual fund fees (MER) and widely disseminated 
provides much better and more complete industry-wide cost information. The result is a 
more transparent and competitive marketplace and a socially superior arrangement.
7. A CHANGING MARKET ENVIRONMENT
Large Canadian financial intermediaries are, like their American brethren, shifting to 
wealth management in order to transform their retail revenue profile away from volatile 
trading commissions towards more stable asset-based fees. Responding to these changes, 
fund manufacturers have re-priced the Series F version of their mutual funds to account 
for advice services being already paid through the distributor charges on the AUM of client 
portfolios. These developments bring to the fore the “advice gap” issue and, consequently, 
do not dispose of the bundling of financial advice with financial products from the policy 
debate. Under an AUM-based pricing model, the minimum asset threshold to maintain a 
“finance-advised” account in Canada is estimated to be $150,000.124 The attractiveness 
of the AUM-based pricing policy for full-service brokerages owned by a Canadian bank 
is undeniable in view of the average value of assets held by their clients standing at about 
$430,000. This clientele is atypical of the broad retail market.
Investor surveys consistently report that a large majority of Canadian retail investors 
opened an account with a financial adviser when they had only modest amounts of 
investable assets (i.e., less than $25,000).125 They access financial advice services through 
distribution channels other than bank-owned securities and mutual funds brokerage firms. 
In 2014, the average account at a small and mid-size (SMB) mutual funds dealer was 
$44,000 (and $109,000 at branch-based firms), while clients at SMB full-service securities 
brokerages have an average of $169,000 in investible assets.126
As long as the transition towards an AUM-based pricing model is the result of market 
forces, one would expect the structure of the industry to evolve towards another 
competitive equilibrium. However, if the payment of embedded fees or commissions by 
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It would most likely result in the opening of a wide “advice gap” whereby modest- and 
middle-income Canadians would be either orphaned by financial firms because their 
financial assets or regular income do not meet the high thresholds typical of AUM-based 
pricing models, or repelled by the obligation to pay upfront for financial advice rather than 
spreading its cost over time.
Confronted with an actual or potential “advice gap”, many observers show little concern, 
convinced that entrepreneurial spirit and ingenuity will lead some firms to see it as an 
opportunity rather than a problem. Economists in particular are prone to reducing the 
nature and scope of the phenomena to simple issues of costing and pricing levels. The 
comments of the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers are illustrative of this attitude: 
“The cost of advice depends primarily on the resources necessary to provide it — the 
adviser’s time, IT infrastructure, and other inputs — rather than the form of the adviser’s 
compensation. Thus, an adviser receiving payment through non-conflicted structures 
should be able to provide advice at the same cost as an adviser receiving conflicted 
payments, as long as the inputs in time and infrastructure are equal. If advisers serving 
moderate-income Americans can remain profitable regardless of whether they receive 
conflicted or non-conflicted compensation, one would expect the number of advisers 
working with lower-balance savers to remain the same regardless of whether conflict-based 
payment systems remain in use.”127 Consumers and industry responses to the unbundling of 
financial advice from financial products indicate that the matter is much more complex and 
that it does not lend itself to simple adaptations, at least not without collateral costs in terms 
of wealth accumulation by non-affluent households.
An emerging industry response to the banning of embedded commissions is the resurgence 
of direct sales forces by large asset managers and financial companies. In the United 
Kingdom, Prudential began implementing the strategy in 2012. Other large financial 
institutions are following suit. Barclays, HSBC and Santander have all announced plans 
to expand their direct-to-financial-consumer offerings and self-directed execution-only 
platforms.
The transformation of the financial advice industry from a horizontal to a vertical structure 
— from an environment where dealer firms and financial advisers have access to the 
financial products of several manufacturers to one where the industry is dominated by 
a small number of firms that act as the distribution arm of the institution’s proprietary 
products — should be of particular concern to Canadian policy-makers for two major 
reasons. The first pertains to the breadth of advice provided in a captive setting. The 
evidence suggests that financial advisers at captive distribution firms are incentivized 
through several mechanisms to promote in-house products “regardless of the form of 
compensation.”128 Synovate finds that EU banks tend to recommend their proprietary 
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products more than 80 per cent of the time.129 A similar bias was documented in U.S. firms 
with proprietary funds.130 In the U.K., observers were prompted to note that “a significant 
growth in direct sales forces would seem to be counter to everything the FCA have been 
trying to achieve with RDR,”131 an issue that did not go unnoticed in Brussels. The new 
MiFID II distinguishes between “independent” and “tied” advice. In particular, firms 
must disclose to their clients whether or not the advice considers products from a range of 
providers and if that advice is based on a broad or restricted consideration of different types 
of financial instruments. The directive does not prevent financial advisers providing “tied” 
advice from receiving embedded commissions from the manufacturer.
The presence of vertically integrated financial-product “manufacturers” in the retail market 
may not be a major cause for concern in and of itself as long as these manufacturers have 
a large range of products on offer, this structure is not the dominant form of organization 
— so that financial consumers are left with “real” choices — and there is full disclosure 
to clients. Vertically integrated firms may also deliver additional benefits to the market if 
they are successful in reaping synergistic economies from their structure. For instance, 
Scotiabank reports that the minimum asset threshold for receiving financial advice from an 
adviser at Investors Group was much lower than the industry norm.132 
The second reason stems from the dysfunctional effects arising from a high level of 
concentration in an industry structured around a small number of vertically integrated 
financial organizations that manifest themselves through fund-flow patterns and fund-
return performance.133 Among OECD members, Canada stands out for the high level of 
concentration in its banking sector: six banks control about 90 per cent of bank assets. 
Canadians treat their primary bank as a “one-stop shop” where they purchase the majority 
of their financial services. The funds industry is an exception: firms independent of deposit-
taking institutions still account for a majority of the sales of mutual funds and hold about 
40 per cent of Canada’s mutual fund assets. The horizontal structure of the industry, where 
strong financial-product manufacturers compete to serve independent retail distributors, 
has shown its efficacy by allowing the financial advice industry to resist the powerful 
gravitational pull of Canadian banks. The unbundling of advice from financial products, 
coupled with the heavier regulatory and compliance costs that typically accompany it, 
would put significant pressure on the industry, tilting the balance of forces towards a 
vertical industry structure and the segmentation of clients that ensues. This, in turn, forces 
independent fund manufacturers to build channels to deal directly with financial consumers 
rather than through financial intermediaries, further accelerating the transformation of the 
financial advice industry towards a “captive” structure.
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It is no coincidence that the dominant fund manufacturers in North America are at the 
forefront of the deployment of automated advisory services that provide retail investors 
(and financial advisers) with online access to investment advice at a very low cost. Using 
sophisticated algorithms, “robo-advisers” help individual investors build portfolios 
constituted of ETFs based on the investor’s age, risk aversion, income requirements, 
investment timeframe, income, savings and assets. Robo-advice leaders include: Personal 
Advisor Services (Vanguard), FutureAdvisor (BlackRock), Charles Schwab’s Schwab 
Intelligent Portfolios, Betterment, and Wealthfront in the United States; Nutmeg (Schroders) 
in the United Kingdom; and Wealthsimple (Power Financial) in Canada. While some 
platforms are fully automated others combine the system with an adviser, thus providing a 
hybrid service to clients by telephone, video link, e-mail or Internet chat. The latter is the 
rule in Canada, and CSA guidance regarding online advice is clear that fully automated 
systems as operated in the United States would not conform to Canadian regulations. 
Although the success of “robo-advisory” platforms in capturing meaningful market share 
is subject to debate and their regulation is bound to raise questions about the profiling of 
clients, the appropriateness of the recommendations in individual cases and the recourse 
offered clients in cases of “mis-selling,” there is no doubt that “robots aren’t going to go 
away.”134 Drawing on the experience of the discount brokerage industry, it is unlikely 
that automated digital wealth-management platforms will close the “advice gap” that 
would be created by a regulatory regime prohibiting the bundling of advice with financial 
products. Hence, the importance of ensuring that the proficiency and competitiveness of the 
traditional financial advice industry is continually improved, to ensure that its contribution 
to the accumulation and efficient management of wealth by individual households is 
strengthened, not needlessly diminished.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Structural changes in the retirement income system mean that, for a growing majority of 
Canadians, the adequacy of retirement income will depend on the amount of savings made 
during their active working life and the wealth accumulated at retirement. The changes 
also mean that retail financial markets gain importance. As the range of financial products 
has expanded, complexity has followed, taxing individual investors’ aptitudes to make 
informed financial decisions. In this context, individual investors’ savings and investment 
practices become increasingly critical to wealth accumulation and easy access to 
professional financial advisers must be seen as a critical component of the broader financial 
capacity-building system available to individual investors. Obviously advisers increase 
investment costs. The evidence is compelling that investors who use advisers exhibit 
greater rationality and make more efficient asset allocation decisions, have higher savings 
and a more diversified portfolio and, thus, accumulate greater financial wealth than most of 
those who do not use an adviser. 
To profit fully from these socio-economic benefits, public policies must acknowledge 
the prevalence of cognitive fallibilities among individual investors and favour easy and 
affordable access to professional financial advice on terms that meet their preferences. 
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A compelling body of empirical research demonstrates that regardless of their level 
of financial education and wealth, left to their own devices, individuals’ investment 
and savings decisions are, as a rule, sub-optimal compared to the results obtained by 
“advised” investors. It is demonstrated that the propensity to plan leads to greater wealth 
accumulation and psychological findings indicate that an individual’s propensity to plan can 
be changed through minor nudges.135 Other studies demonstrate that financial literacy can 
be taught but that it will only be effective in influencing decision-making when combined 
with timely decision support.136 Financial literacy does not carry with it an incentive to act. 
Without the help of professional advice, there exists scant evidence that improvements in 
the levels of financial knowledge and skills will lead by itself to better financial decision-
making and more wealth at retirement. In fact, the main value of greater financial literacy 
may be to increase the propensity to seek financial advice. For instance, employer-based 
retirement education programs in the workplace appear to displace non-professional sources 
of information and guidance rather than professional financial advisers.137
The idea that it is possible to “sterilize” an environment so that individual investors are not 
influenced whatsoever is misconstrued. Whether intended or not, the setting affects what 
individuals choose. It is manifest that embedded commissions, whether fully disclosed 
or not, facilitate the choice of the financial-adviser option, whereas a prohibition of the 
practice would lead a large segment of investors to forego or be denied the service. These 
two policy options channel individual investors towards a different end game; they are 
not neutral. Regulation should encourage choice. Canadian investors should have access 
to a wide range of competing products and financial intermediaries, regardless of whether 
advice is delivered using commission- or fee-based advice models.
The fundamental role of the financial-intermediation function is to facilitate savings and 
promote the sound management of financial assets. Individual investors want trustworthy, 
qualified and experienced financial advisers; they expect financial advisers to deliver much 
more than strict compliance with the norms and standards of the industry. Drawing on 
the experience of other jurisdictions, the transparency of distribution fees and investment 
returns brought about by the full implementation of the Client Relationship Model-2 
rule (CRM2) to complement the wide distribution of the MER should lead the industry 
to place a stronger emphasis on standards, continuous education programs and other 
means to improve the competencies and proficiency of financial advisers and increase 
professionalism in retail financial advice. 
A common tool used in retail industries to ascertain the quality of service at the point 
of sale is mystery shopping. Several academic studies have applied the method to assess 
the quality of financial advice and a few regulators (Australia, Hong Kong, United 
Kingdom, Singapore) have used the approach to collect first-hand information to inform 
their regulatory and compliance policies. For instance, ASIC, in co-operation with the 
Australian financial industry, used the method to investigate the quality of retirement 
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advice provided and retail investors’ experience when interfacing with a financial adviser, 
and then published the findings.138 In Canada, the Ontario Securities Commission, in co-
operation with IIROC and the MFDA, conducted in 2014 a mystery shop of advisers across 
Ontario. Overall, advisory practices and investor experience were commendable, with 84 
per cent of shoppers stating that their experiences were positive.139 Clearly, there remains 
room for improvement. But that is precisely the point of the exercise: to identify the areas 
that need focused attention and to provide practical input for the development of advisory 
best-practice guidance. Adopted by the Canadian industry with the support of the CSA 
and conducted on a regular basis, such an approach devoid of the dysfunctional aspects of 
intrusive regulations would have a powerful and lasting influence on the conduct of the 
financial advice industry.
Trust in the financial advice industry would certainly be enhanced if there were more 
discipline and standardization on the use of titles, which, in addition, would facilitate 
compliance with proficiency requirements. This issue is not peculiar to Canada. In the 
United States, the Rand Institute for Civil Justice formulated similar comments in its 2008 
report on investors’ perceptions of financial advisers and broker-dealers.140 The fact that, 
at present, there is no professional accreditation (beyond basic registration) for financial 
advisers complicates the matter. Nevertheless, the need to ensure titles are not misleading 
and reflect accurately the nature and scope of the services provided should be self-evident 
to the industry’s self-regulatory bodies. Active consideration should also be given to the 
benefits that would accrue from the establishment of a professional designation for financial 
advisers, which, as for other professions, would entail formal training with an agreed 
curriculum and more extensive continuing education requirements than what presently 
exists.141
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the operation of the Canadian market 
for financial advice has, heretofore, been successful in producing beneficial outcomes for 
households that obtain the service, and for society as a whole. Countries where financial 
advice has been unbundled from financial products, either as a result of market forces or 
regulatory fiat, have seen the opening of a large “advice gap” and an increase in the total 
cost of the services for a large proportion of retail customers. A large number of middle-
income individuals who need the advice but do not own enough financial assets to make 
the provision of regulated financial advice an economic business proposition under a fee-
for-advice pricing policy were effectively denied access to affordable financial advice142 and 
led to engage in financial transactions without the protections afforded to investors dealing 
through a regulated financial adviser.
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Under the current remuneration arrangements, access to and affordability of financial 
advice for Canadians is augmented, the advised population is much larger than would 
otherwise be the case under other remuneration structures, the propensity to save is 
increased and the accumulation of wealth is enhanced through better saving habits and 
investment practices. These considerations call for policies that recognize explicitly: that 
affordable and broadly accessible professional-quality financial advice produces a public 
good in the form of greater individual wealth accumulation for which there is no substitute; 
that embedding fees and commissions is an efficient arrangement to achieve this social 
objective; and that the principle of full transparency is paramount, both in the context of 
the relationship between financial advisers and their individual clients and on an industry-
wide basis. It is difficult to think of any measure more cost-effective than broad access to 
financial advice capable of producing a rise of similar proportion in the financial wealth 
of the large and growing population segment of Canadians who depend on their private 
savings to maintain their quality of life in retirement.
36
About the Author
Pierre Lortie is a Senior Business Advisor at Dentons LLP. He is Executive Chairman of Quest Rare Minerals Ltd., 
Director of group Canam and Element Financial Corporation.
Mr. Lortie is President of the Canadian Academy of Engineering, Director of the Research Center of the McGill 
University Health Center and of the Canadian Center of Innovation for Manufacturers (ETS), President of the 
Canadian Ditchley Foundation and Chairman of The Schmeelk Canada Foundation
A former President and COO of Bombardier Capital, Bombardier Aerospace, Regional Aircraft, Bombardier 
International and Bombardier Transportation. He is also a former Chairman, President and CEO of Provigo Inc, 
President and CEO of the Montréal Stock Exchange and Senior Partner of SECOR Inc.
Pierre served as Chairman of Canada’s Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, has representative 
of the Prime Minister of Canada on the APEC Business Advisory Council as well as Vice Chairman of Canada’s 
National Advisory Board on Science and Technology and as Chairman of the Centre for Information Technology 
Innovation.
Mr. Lortie received an MBA with honours from the University of Chicago, a license in applied economics from the 
Université Louvain in Belgium, and a Bachelor's degree in applied sciences (engineering physics) from Université 
Laval. He was awarded a Doctorate Honoris Causa in civil law from Bishop’s University. He was elected Fellow of the 
Canadian Academy of Engineering in 1988 and appointed Member of the Order of Canada in 2001.
37
ABOUT THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
The School of Public Policy has become the flagship school of its kind in Canada by providing a practical, global and 
focused perspective on public policy analysis and practice in areas of energy and environmental policy, international policy 
and economic and social policy that is unique in Canada. 
The mission of The School of Public Policy is to strengthen Canada’s public service, institutions and economic performance 
for the betterment of our families, communities and country. We do this by: 
• Building capacity in Government through the formal training of public servants in degree and non-degree programs, 
giving the people charged with making public policy work for Canada the hands-on expertise to represent our vital 
interests both here and abroad;
• Improving Public Policy Discourse outside Government through executive and strategic assessment programs, building 
a stronger understanding of what makes public policy work for those outside of the public sector and helps everyday 
Canadians make informed decisions on the politics that will shape their futures;
• Providing a Global Perspective on Public Policy Research through international collaborations, education, and community 
outreach programs, bringing global best practices to bear on Canadian public policy, resulting in decisions that benefit 
all people for the long term, not a few people for the short term.
Our research is conducted to the highest standards of scholarship and objectivity. The decision to pursue research is made 
by a Research Committee chaired by the Research Director and made up of Area and Program Directors. All research is 
subject to blind peer-review and the final decision whether or not to publish is made by an independent Director.
The School of Public Policy
University of Calgary, Downtown Campus
906 8th Avenue S.W., 5th Floor
Calgary, Alberta T2P 1H9
Phone: 403 210 3802
DISTRIBUTION
Our publications are available online at www.policyschool.ca.
DISCLAIMER
The opinions expressed in these publications are the authors' alone and 
therefore do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the supporters, staff, 
or boards of The School of Public Policy.
COPYRIGHT
Copyright © 2016 by The School of Public Policy. 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any 
manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief 
passages quoted in critical articles and reviews.
ISSN
1919-112x SPP Research Papers (Print) 
1919-1138 SPP Research Papers (Online)
DATE OF ISSUE
April 2016
MEDIA INQUIRIES AND INFORMATION
For media inquiries, please contact Morten Paulsen at 403-220-2540. 
Our web site, www.policyschool.ca, contains more information about The 
School's events, publications, and staff.
DEVELOPMENT
For information about contributing to The School of Public Policy, please 
contact Rachael Lehr by telephone at 403-210-7183 or by e-mail at 
racrocke@ucalgary.ca.
38
RECENT PUBLICATIONS BY THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
THE THEORY AND EVIDENCE CONCERNING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN CANADA AND ELSEWHERE
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/theory-and-evidence-concerning-public-private-partnerships-canada-and-elsewhere
Anthony Boardman, Matti Siemiatycki and Aidan Vining | March 2016
THE COSTLIEST TAX OF ALL: RAISING REVENUE THROUGH CORPORATE TAX HIKES CAN BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE FOR THE PROVINCES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/costliest-tax-all-raising-revenue-through-corporate-tax-hikes-can-be-counter-productive-prov
Bev Dahlby and Ergete Ferede | March 2016
CUTTING PROVINCIAL CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES TO PROMOTE INVESTMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/cutting-provincial-corporate-income-tax-rates-promote-investment-employment-and-economic-gro
Bev Dahlby and Ergete Ferede | March 2016
INTO THE MIRE: A CLOSER LOOK AT FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/mire-closer-look-fossil-fuel-subsidies
Radoslaw Stefanski | March 2016
THE ISSUE OF SOCIAL LICENCE AND ENERGY UTILITY PLANNING AND INVESTMENT
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/issue-social-licence-and-energy-utility-planning-and-investment
Michal C. Moore | March 2016
IS SOCIAL LICENCE A LICENCE TO STALL?
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/social-licence-licence-stall
Mark Lowey | March 2016
A FISCAL FRAMEWORK FOR OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES IN ROMANIA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/fiscal-framework-offshore-oil-and-gas-activities-romania
Daria Crisan | March 2016
LIFTING THE HOOD ON ALBERTA’S ROYALTY REVIEW
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/lifting-hood-alberta%E2%80%99s-royalty-review
Blake Shaffer | February 2016
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW PUBLIC OUTLOOK ON THE ECONOMY AND MIDDLE-CLASS DECLINE: HOW FDI ATTITUDES ARE CAUGHT IN A 
TENTATIVE CLOSING OF THE CANADIAN MIND
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/understanding-new-public-outlook-economy-and-middle-class-decline-how-fdi-attitudes-are-caug
Frank Graves | February 2016
GIVE CANADA POST A BREAK: ALLOWING MORE PRICING FLEXIBILITY AND COMPETITION COULD HELP THE CORPORATION SUCCEED
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/give-canada-post-break-allowing-more-pricing-flexibility-and-competition-could-help-corporat
Philippe De Donder | February 2016
RATES OF RETURN ON FLOW-THROUGH SHARES: INVESTORS AND GOVERNMENTS BEWARE
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/rates-return-flow-through-shares-investors-and-governments-beware
Vijay Jog | February 2016
THE FALSE PANACEA OF CITY CHARTERS? A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CASE OF TORONTO
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/false-panacea-city-charters-political-perspective-case-toronto-0
Andrew Sancton | January 2016
